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BRIEF OF APPELLEE
BRUBAKER CONSTRUCTION, INC.

Plaintiff/Appellee Brubaker Construction, Inc. respectfully
submits the following brief on appeal:
I.

JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to

§78-2-2(3)j and §78-2a-3(k) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL
Issue 1: Did Plaintiff/Appellee Brubaker Construction, Inc.

("Brubaker") waive contractual provisions requiring
Defendant/Appellant Darrel Jex

("Jex") to verify that electrical

and plumbing lines had been properly tied or capped off?
Jex argues that this issue is merely a legal question and
therefore, this Court should give no deference to the conclusions
of the trial court.

However, Jex is actually challenging the

trial court's findings of fact as to the meaning and effect of
Brubakerfs superintendent's statement that "everything was taken
care of".

Therefore, to "mount a successful attack upon the

correctness of a trial couxt's findings of fact, an appellant
must first marshal all tho evidence in support of the finding and
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most
favorable to the court below." Willard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil &
Gas Co.. 899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted).
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due

regard shall be give the opportunity of the trial court to judge
the credibility of the witnesses.

Utah Rules of Civ. Proc.

52(a).
Issue 2: Was Brubaker estopped from claiming damages against
Jex based on Jex's reliance on Brubaker's statement that the
electrical and plumbing lines had been tied off?
Again, Jex argues that Issue 2 is purely a legal question.
However, Jex is challenging the trial court's findings of fact as
to the meaning and effect of Brubaker's superintendent's
statements.

Therefore, to "mount a successful attack upon the

correctness of a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant
must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most
favorable to the court below." Willard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil &
Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted).
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be give the opportunity of the trial court to judge
the credibility of the witnesses.

Utah Rules of Civ. Proc.

52(a).
Issue 3: Did the trial court err in awarding Brubaker delay
damages?
Once again, Jex argues Issue 3 is a legal question only.
However, Jex is challenging the trial court's findings of fact
that Jex was the cause of delay.

Therefore, to "mount a
2

successful attack upon the correctness of a trial court's
findings of fact, an appellant must first marshal all the
evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when
viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below," Willard
Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995)
(citations omitted).
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be give the opportunity of the trial court to judge
the credibility of the witnesses.

Utah Rules of Civ. Proc.

52(a).
Issue 4: Did the trial court err in determining that
Brubaker had not waived delay damages by its course of dealing
with Jex?
Jex is arguing the trial court's factual findings of delay
damages.

Therefore, to "mount a successful attack upon the

correctness of a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant
must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most
favorable to the court below." Willard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil &
Gas Co.. 899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted).
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be give the opportunity of the trial court to judge
3

the credibility of the witnesses.

Utah Rules of Civ. Proc.

52(a).
III. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
There are no determinative constitutional provisions or
statutes applicable to this matter.
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case:

Jex was the successful bidder on a subcontract for
demolition after having had access to and having reviewed the
plans and specifications for the project which involved
demolition and construction of the Central Middle School in
Ogden, Utah. (Findings of Fact No.l).
Jex and Brubaker entered into a formal contract on June 4,
1993 (Findings of Fact No.2).

The contract required the work to

be commenced by June 9, 1993 and completed by July 1, 1993.
successful completion, Jex was to be paid $58,000.

For

(Findings of

Fact No. 3 ) .
Due to the discovery of asbestos in the building, Jex did
not begin demolition until June 19, 1996.
p.67, lines 1-55).

(Trial Transcript

However, Jex never made any request to

Brubaker Construction to extend the time of completion due to the
later starting date. (Trial Transcript p.67, lines 6-14).
Jex began demolition on the building without personally
verifying that plumbing and electrical systems had been
disconnected. (Trial Transcript, p.67, lines 15-25).

The plans

and specifications required Jex to verify that all work to be

4

removed, electrical had been completely shut off and any piping,
conduit, et cetera, be tied off or capped of.

(Conclusions of

Law No.1).
Jex failed to complete the contract until late August of
1993, almost 60 days past the July 1, 1993 deadline (Findings of
Fact No. 4 and 7 ) .

The trial court found that the delays were

the result of needed repairs to damaged electrical wires in a
junction box in the demolished building, damaged conduit pipe and
racks, which were not properly "removed, capped or tied off"
pursuant to section 02200 of the plans and specifications.
(Findings of Fact No.4).

In addition, other structural damage

occurred which Jex acknowledged having caused, and Jex' refusal
to saw-cut certain concrete extension walls added to the delay.
(Findings of Fact No. 5 ) .
B.

Course of proceedings:

Brubaker brought this action against Jex claiming damages in
an amount to be proven at trial but not less than $55,500.00 for
delay damages and costs to repair structural damages suffered by
Brubaker as a consequence of Jex's breaches of a contract to
perform demolition in connection with the remodeling of the
Central Middle School in Ogden, Utah.

Jex brought a counterclaim

against Brubaker for amounts allegedly due Jex under the contract
between the parties in the amount of $18,840.00.

Jex further

filed a Third-Party Complaint against CNA Surety Claims,
Brubakerfs payment bond surety.

However, the Third-Party

Complaint was never served on CNA.
5

C. Disposition at trial court:
This matter was tried to the Court, sitting without a jury,
on October 24, 1995.

The Court entered its Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Judgment on November 27, 1995 and granted
judgment in favor of Brubaker in the amount of $88,950,00,
together with attorney's fees and interest.
VI.SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Issue 1.

Jex argues that Brubaker waived contractual

provisions requiring Jex to verify that the electrical and
plumbing had been properly tied or capped off.

However, in

Conclusions of Law No.l, the trial court made the explicit
finding that Brubaker did not waive Jex? s required performance
under the plans and specifications.

These plans and

specifications required Jex to "verify that all work to be
removed, electrical has been completely shut off and any piping,
conduit, et cetera, is tied off or capped off.". (Conclusions of
Law No.l).

Jex has failed to demonstrate that Brubaker

intentionally relinquished this contractual requirement.
Brubakerfs superintendent did not indicate that Jex should not
make an independent verification of whether the plumbing and
electrical were tied off or capped off.
Issue 2.

Jex argues that Brubaker is estopped from claiming

Damages against Jex based on Jex's reliance on Brubakerfs
statements that the electrical and plumbing had been properly
tied and capped off.

However, Brubaker did not make any

representations to Jex that Jex should not independently verify

6

that the electrical and plumbing had been properly tied and
capped off.

Jex merely interpreted the superintendent's

statement as such.

Moreover, Jex did not reasonably act upon the

actual statements made by Brubaker's superintendent.

Contrary to

Jex's argument, the fact that Jex is not a licensed plumber or
electrician does not justify his reliance on the superintendent's
statements.
Issue 3.

Jex argues that Brubaker is not entitled to delay

damages for those periods of delay caused by Brubaker.

However,

the trial court specifically found that delay damages were the
result of repairs needed where Jex damaged electrical wire in a
junction box in the demolished building and damaged conduit pipe
and racks.

(Findings of Fact No.4).

In addition, Jex's refusal

to saw-cut certain concrete extension walls added to the delay.
(Findings of Fact No.5).

Jex's mistakenly argues that the

contract notice of delay requirement was meaningless in this
situation since Brubaker knew of the delay.

Jex fails to

properly interpret this contract provision.
Issue 4.

Jex argues that Brubaker waived delay damages

because Brubaker never made any claim for delay while Jex
performed his demolition.

However, Brubaker was not required to

make such claims during the demolition period.

Moreover, the

delays were not a result of Jex's slow performance but were the
result of Jex's damage to electrical items and refusal to perform
certain work.

7

VII.ARGUMENT
POINT I:
BRUBAKER DID NOT WAIVE CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS
REQUIRING JEX TO VERIFY THAT ELECTRICAL AND
PLUMBING LINES HAD BEEN PROPERLY TIED OFF OR CAPPED OFF.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently defined waiver as
"the intentional relinquishment of a known right." Soter's v.
Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan, 857 P.2d 935/ 939-940 (citations
omitted.)

"Waiver requires three elements: (1) an existing

right, benefit, or advantage; (2) knowledge of its existence; and
(3) an intention to relinquish the right." Id. at 940 (citations
omitted).

"On appeal, the question frequently is whether, as a

matter of law, intentional relinquishment was or was not
shown...[T]his legal question is intensely fact dependent...Id.
at 940.

"[A] fact finder should assess the totality of the

circumstances to determine whether the relinquishment is clearly
intended". Id. at 941.

"To mount a successful attack upon the

correctness of a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant
must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most
favorable to the court below." Willard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil &
Gas Co.. 899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted).
Jex fails to demonstrate that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the finding that Brubaker did not waive
any rights.

In addition, Jex has not shown that Brubaker

intentionally relinquished its rights.

8

The trial court made the

explicit finding based on the totality of the facts presented at
trial that Brubaker did not waive Jex's required performance
under the plans and specifications.

These plans and

specifications required Jex to "verify that

wor 1 c tic: be

removed, electrical has been completely shut off and any piping,
conduit, et cetera, is tied off or capped off.". (Conclusion of
Law No.1).
Jex's appellate brief indicates that Issue 1 is a legal
question and therefore, the Court should give no deference to the
conclusions of the court below. (Brief of Ap|icl 1 ai i t, Page 1 ) .
However, Jex is actually challenging the trial court's findings
of fact as to whether Brubaker waived any rights and therefore,
the Court should disregard the label gi vei I to 1: he fi nd
look to the substance of the finding.

and

State v. Rio Vista Oil,

Jex argues that Brubakerfs

Ltd.. 786 p.2d 1343 (Utah 1990).
superintendent indicatec

he need not i ndependently

verify the electrical and plumbing systems.

The meaning of the

superintendent's statement is a factual question yet Jex has
failed to marshal all the. evidence in suppoi t of I IK « trial
court's finding that there was no waiver, and demonstrate that
the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even
when viewing i t: :;i i: i a 1 i ght most favorable to the court below.
Although Jex argues that Brubaker, through its
superintendent, allegedly told Jex that the plumbing and
electrical t lad been lied oil ox capped of, Brubakerfs
superintendent merely indicated that "everything was taken care
9

of. M (Trial Transcript, p.73, lines 3 through p.74, line 8 ) .

The

trial court determined this statement was not a waiver of Jex's
contractual obligation to verify these facts before beginning his
demolition work.

Brubaker did not intentionally relinquish Jex's

contractual requirement to make an independent verification that
the electrical and plumbing were shut off and capped off.
Contrary to Jex's assertion in his brief, Brubaker's
superintendent did not indicate that Jex should not make an
independent verification.

Nor did the superintendent assert that

the building was ready to knock down.

Jex merely interpreted the

superintendent's statement that "everything was taken care of" to
mean that "everything was capped off, ready to knock down."
(Trial Transcript, p.74, lines 6-16.)

However, the

superintendent did not make such a statement.
Therefore, Jex's appellate brief fails to show that there
was an "intentional relinquishment" of Brubaker's contractual
right that Jex verify independently that the plumbing and
electrical were tied off.
Jex argues that this case is similar to B.R. Woodward
Marketing v. Collins Food. 754 P.2d 99 (Utah App. 1988).
However, that case has little similarity to the matter here.
B.R. Woodward involved the waiver of an employee's right to claim
compensation where the employee failed to request the
compensation until after termination.

Here, Jex alleges the

statement by Brubaker's superintendent was the relinquishment of
Jex's requirement to make an independent investigation of whether
10

the electrical ai id pJ i imbii ig wer e ti ed off
a party's failure to act.

&.&.Woodward concerns

Woodward failed to say anything about

being compensated until after his termination.

754 p.2d at 100.

The matter <it hand involves an alleged affirmative voluntary ••
statement of relinquishment by Brubaker.

However, Brubaker never

relinquished the requirement that Jex make an independent
invpstigation,

Rmbaker's superintendent may have indicated that

Jex could proceed with his work after the asbestos problem was
solved, but Brubaker never said Jex should not make an
independent verification of the status of the plumbing and
electrical,

Jex wrongly interpreted the superintendentf s

statement as such.
made by 1!
requirement

-•••

f

But as the trial court found, the statements

s superintendent did not waive the contract

. Conclusions of Law No, J ) Therefor e, tl :i I s Coi lr t

should uphold the trial court finding that Brubaker's
superintendent' s statements to Jex were insufficient to waive or
limit Jex's required performance pursuant to the plans and
specifications.
' '

POINT III

BRUBAKER IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING DAMAGES
AGAINST JEX FOR DAMAGING ELECTRICAL LINES.
I n o r d e r t o i n v o k e tin* cioctiiric* uf e s t u p p e . 1 ,

"the tost

is

whether there is conduct, by act or omission, by which one party
knowingly leads another party, reasonably acting thereon, to take
some course of action, which will resuJ t I i I 1 li s detriment o r
damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate or deny his
conduct or representation.

u.P. Koch, Inc. v. J.C. Penney
11

Company, Inc.. 534 P.2d 903, 904 (Utah 1975).
Here, Jex claims that Brubaker is estopped from repudiating
its representations in obtaining damages. (Brief of Appellant,
page 13)

Jex uses several cases to support his argument.

However, these cases are different from the matter at hand
because the cases all involve a party's attempt to renege on
specific unambiguous representations or contractual agreements.
Here, Jex attempts to estop Brubaker from collecting damages
based on Jex's misinterpretation of statements made by Brubaker's
superintendent.

However, Brubaker did not knowingly make any

representations to Jex and Jex did not reasonably act upon the
statements made by Brubaker's superintendent.
Brubaker's superintendent told Jex that "everything is taken
care of".

(Trial transcript, p.74, line 6 ) .

Jex understood that

statement to mean that "the plumbing was capped off, which it
was." (Trial transcript, p.74, line 8 ) .

Brubaker's

superintendent did not knowingly tell or infer to Jex that Jex
was relieved of his contractual duty to independently verify that
the plumbing and electrical were capped off or tied off.
Brubaker never said to Jex that Jex could start demolition
without making an independent verification.

Jex misinterpreted

the statement to mean that he could begin to knock down the
building. (Trial transcript, p.74, line 17-18).

Jex failed to

make an independent investigation of the plumbing and electrical
systems.

As a result, as the lower court found, Brubaker was

required to perform repairs to damages electrical wires in a
12

junction box in the demolished building, damaged conduit pipp aiul
racks, which were not properly capped or tied off pursuant to the
plans and specification. (Findings of Fact No.4).
Jex also asserts t! lat because 1: le was no I: a pi umber or
electrician, he needed to rely upon Brubakerfs representative,
(Brief of Appellant, page 13). This assertion has no merit.

The

fact that Jex is not a plumber ot electrician is irrelevant.

If

no statement had been made by Brubakerf s superintendent to Jex,
Jex would still have been required to make an independent
verification of f ho | > 1 iimb i nq timl electrical systems, even if Jex
were not a plumber or electrician.

The fact that Brubaker's

superintendent made a statement to Jex did not alter Jex's
contractutil requi remon! to make the investigation.

Jex could-"

have hired an electrician or plumber to verify that the systems
were capped or tied off.
POINT

ix.

BRUBAKER IS ENTITLED TO DELAY DAMAGES AGAINST
JEX AS A RESULT OF NEEDED REPAIRS TO DAMAGED
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM AND JEX'S REFUSAL TO SAW-CUT
CONCRETE EXTENSION WALLS.
In the Findings of Fact, the trial court found that the
delays were a re.suit of needed repairs to damaged electrical wire
in a junction box in the demolished building and damaged conduit
pipe and racks.

(Findings of Fact No.4).

In addition, Jex's

refusal to saw-cut certai11 concrete extension walls added to the
delay. (Findings of Fact No.5).

Brubaker, as a result of tilese

delays suffered damages. (Findings of Fact No.8).
claimed he was not allowed

Even if Hex

start due to asbestos removal, this
13

assertion was insufficient to waive or limit his required
performance pursuant to the plans and specifications because he
notified no one pursuant to the plans and specifications.
(Conclusions of Law, No.2).
Jex argues that Brubaker is not entitled to delay damages
because: (1) Jex was not able to start work until June 19, a tenday delay, and notification of the delay (as required by the
contract) to Brubaker would have been meaningless since Brubaker
was aware of the delay; and (2) the delays were the result of
needed repairs to the electrical system which might be
attributable to Brubaker.

However, Jex has failed to adequately

support his arguments and his arguments are contrary to the
findings and conclusions of the trial court.
Jex's assertion that notification of the delay to Brubaker
would have been meaningless misinterprets the purpose of the
contract requirement.

Under plans and specifications, page 4,

section 2200, Jex was required to "refer to the general
contractor any conditions detrimental to proper and timely
completion of the work." (Conclusions of Law No.2).

The purpose

of this section is to make the general contractor aware of
conditions which will affect job completion.

The fact that

Brubaker knew of the asbestos problem does not make section 2200
"meaningless".

Brubaker would need to know from Jex, how, if at

all, the delay in starting demolition would impact Jex's
completion date.

Jex may have included contingencies in his

schedule to account for such delays.
14

Brubaker would be unaware

of such contingencies unless

Jrx made him aw.ue of ihem.

The

: v

'"

asbestos problem may or may not have had any effect upon Jex's
completion date.

Therefore, the contractual provision relied

upo:

..airing notice should apply even if

Brubaker had actual knowledge of the delay.

The provision is not

"meaningless" as Jex contends.
Jex ci tes several cases to si lpport his argument that
Brubaker is not entitled to delay damages.

However, the holdings

of these cases do not apply to the matter at hand.
City of Fillmore, f

In Hiqqins v.

in x^oi), the Court held that

one who causes a delay or contributes thereto may be precluded
from recovering damages.
City caused - '•

In Hiqqins, the Court found that the

delays and therefore, the City was not entitled ••

to withhold liquidated damages. Id. at 1 94, More, on the other
hand, there was no finding by the trial court that Brubaker
causer! any dpl.fi>,,
delays.

1.. Irjr.l, Hie trial court held that Jex caused

(Findings of Fact, No. 4 and 5 ) . Therefore, Hiqqins

does not apply here.
Jex al so c a tes Western Engineers, Inc. v. State Road
Commission, 20 Utah 2d 294, 437 P.2d ?16 (1968) where the Court
held that a "no damages" provision in construction contracts
would 1,H" precluded if the delay is the result of fraud or active
interference on the part of one seekinq the benefit of the
provision.

437 P.2d at 217.

Here, the trial Court did not find

nor has Jex provided any evidence of "fraud" or "active
interference" by Brubaker.

Jex merely claims that Brubakei:
15

caused the delay, although the trial court made no such finding
or conclusion.

Therefore, Western Engineers does not apply here.

Jex also cites Wevher Construction Co. v. Cox Construction
Co., 22 Utah 2d 365, 453 P.2d 161 (1969), where the Supreme Court
sustained a jury verdict in favor of a subcontractor for damages.
However, in Wevher. the subcontractor provided notice to the
other party about the costs of delay. Id. at 163.
provided no notice.
meaningless.

Here, Jex

He claims notice would have been

In Wevher. the Court also held that Cox had made it

impossible for Weyher to perform on time.

Here, the trial Court

did not find that Brubaker made it impossible for Jex to perform
on time.
his brief.

Jex also has failed to provide any evidence of such in
Therefore, this Court should uphold the delay damages

found by the trial court.
POINT IV.
BRUBAKER DID NOT WAIVE DELAY DAMAGES
THROUGH ITS COURSE OF DEALING WITH JEX.
In the Fourth Argument of his appellate brief, Jex argues
that Brubaker waived delay damages through its course of dealing
with Jex.

Yet, contrary to Jex's argument, the trial court found

that Jex caused delays to the project. (Findings of Fact No. 4
and 5 ) . As a result of these delays, Brubaker suffered damages.
(Findings of Fact No.8).

Jex indicates in his brief that the

issue of whether Brubaker had waived delay damages by its course
of dealing is a legal question. (Brief of Appellant, p.3)
However, Jex is merely making arguments based on the facts
presented at trial.

Therefore, Jex must marshal all relevant
16

evidence presented a t ti: i a] that tei ids to si lppor t tl le findings
and demonstrate why the findings are clearly erroneous.

West

Valley City v. Majestic Inv. C o . , 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah Ct.App.
1991).
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evidence

presented at trial that tends to support the findings and
demonstrate why the findings are clearly erroneous.

Rather, Jex

1 las made vari ous cites fi: on it. t l le ti:i al transcript to support his
argument without showing that the trial court's findings of fact
listed above are erroneous.
Jex indicates that Brubaker did not take any steps to
expedite work or make any demands upon Jex as provided for in the
Project Manual.
line 1 0)

(Trial transcript, p.75, line 18 through p.76,

However, the contract does not require Brubaker to

make such a demand but allows for such demand.
Jex also indicates that Brubaker required an area be cleared
within 30 days, which was accomplished by Jex. (Trial transcript,
p. 79, line 22 through p.80, line 1) However, the delay damages
were not based on clearing any area.

Brubakerfs claim damages

were a result of needed repairs to damaged electrical wires and
conduit pipe and racks, as well as Jex's refusal to saw-ci11
certain concrete extension walls.
In addition, Jex indicates that during his prosecution of
the work, no one from Brubaker I old him fbai fie was causing
delays in the job or was preventing subcontractors from getting
on the job.
6).

(Trial transcript, p.80, line 24 through p.81, line

Again, Brubaker's claim damages were a result of needed
17

repairs to damaged electrical wires and conduit pipe and racks,
as well as Jex's refusal to saw-cut certain concrete extension
walls.

The delay damages were not based on delaying others on

the job but rather on creating extra work to be completed.
Finally, Jex indicates that Brubaker made payments to Jex
and prepared change orders which did not include any claims for
delay damages.

(Trial transcript, p.87, line 10 through p.88,

line 17; p.89, line 12 through p.90).

However, the fact that

Brubaker did not claim any delay damages when making payments to
Jex is not a waiver of the delay damages which Brubaker was
awarded.

Waiver is "the intentional relinquishment of a known

right." Soter's v. Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan, 857 P.2d 935,
939-940 (citations omitted).

None of Jex's supporting evidence

indicates that Brubaker made an intentional relinquishment of his
right to claim delay damages because of the needed repairs to the
electrical items that Jex damaged and Jex's refusal to saw-cut
certain concrete extension walls.

All the evidence presented by

Jex concerns delays in Jex's performance, not the delays for
which Brubaker was awarded damages by the trial court.
Jex has failed to marshall all relevant evidence presented
at trial that tends to support the findings and demonstrate why
the findings are clearly erroneous.

Jex's argument does not deal

with the delay damages awarded by the trial court.

Therefore,

Jex has failed to show that Brubaker waived the claims for delay
damages which were awarded by the trial court.

The trial court's

findings and conclusions should therefore, be upheld.
18

CONCLUSION
The trial court made the explicit finding that Brubaker did
not waive the contract requirement that Jex verify that all
electrical and plumbing be tied off or capped off.

Brubakerfs

superintendent did not indicate that Jex should not make such an
independent verification.

Jex merely misinterpreted the

superintendent's statement.

The fact that Jex is not a licensed

plumber or electrician did not justify his failure to make such
an independent investigation.
Jex argues that Brubaker waived the contractual verification
requirement.

However, waiver requires a showing that a party

intentionally relinquished a right, and Jex has failed to show
that Brubaker intentionally relinquished the contractual
requirement to independently verify the status of the electrical
and plumbing system.
Jex claims that Brubaker was responsible for Jex's delay in
starting the project and therefore, Brubaker is not entitled to
certain delay damages.

Jex also claims that Brubaker never made

any claims that Jex was delaying the project.

However, the

delay damages awarded to Brubaker were the result of repairs
required to electric work which Jex damaged, and the result of
Jex refusing to perform certain work.
Jex not performing in a timely manner.
/
/
/
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They were not related to

Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the trial
courtf s j udgment.

_

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

{"*

/
day of July, 1996.

WALSTAD & BABCOCK

Steven D. Crawley
Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Appellee Brubaker
Construction, Inc.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLEE, postage prepaid, on this
1996 to the following:
Wayne H. Braunberger, Esq.
Ashton, Braunberger, Boud & Wilde
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103
Murray, Utah 84107
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ADDENDUM

nLSDWS7WCTS(?HnT
Third Judicial District

NOV 2 7 1995

*_JE

Steven D. Crawley (0750)
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
57 West South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 531-7000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRUBAKER CONSTRUCTION, INC.
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND JUDGMENT

aao43nq

vs.
DARREL W. JEX, dba DARREL W.
JEX CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff,

Civil No.: 940906516CN
Judge Frederick

vs.
CNA SURETY CLAIMS,
Third-Party
Defendant.
The

above-entitled

matter

came

on

for

trial

before

the

Honorable J. Dennis Frederick on October 24, 1995 sitting without
a jury.

Steven D. Crawley appeared for Plaintiff and Wayne H.

Braunberger appeared for Defendant. The Third-Party Defendant, CNA
Surety Claims, was never served with process in this matter and did
not appear.
The

Court

having

received

exhibits, heard

testimony

and

defendant's refusal to saw-cut certain concrete extension walls
added to the delay.
6.

The electrical damage and repairs were paid for by the

school district initially and then deducted from the plaintiff's
contract, and the charges that were rendered for that service were
reasonable and necessarily incurred.

(See Exhibits 6 & 7 ) . And

those repairs totaled $50,598.00.
7.

Defendant acknowledges that the job was not complete

until around the 26th of August, some 60 days past schedule, even
then not including the electrical repairs that had yet to be
finished.
8.
damages.

The plaintiff, as a result of these delays, suffered
(See Exhibits 6 and 7 ) .

There has been no contrafy

evidence regarding the plaintiff's losses.

This Court therefore,

accepts the plaintiff's proffer that its losses as itemized on
Exhibit 6 are indeed accurate and were necessarily incurred as a
result of the delays occasioned by the defendant's conduct.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
system,

The defendant does not deny damage to the electrical
but

he

claims

that

his

demolition

began

only

after

plaintiff's on-site superintendent told him "everything is taken
care of". Even if true, this assurance is insufficient to waive or
limit defendant's required performance pursuant to the plans and

3

5.

The defendant's Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint

should be dismissed, no cause of action.
JUDGMENT
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That Plaintiff is awarded judgment against defendant in

the principal amount of $88,950.00;
2.

That the judgment shall be augmented by the amount of

attorneys fees that the above-entitled Court shall deem reasonable
pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration;
3.

That the judgment shall bear interest at the highest

legal rate from and after entry until paid in full;
4.

That the Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint are

dismissed with prejudice.
DATED t h i s

'J '>fey Of
»

1

HiML

, 1995.

BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of

1995,

I mailed a copy of the foregoing, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
c~>siH> oocuMEvrr or. F ,*.- -**_
^STRICT* CCU'

